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Articles
Willis L. M. Reese*

Limitations on the
Extraterritorial Application of
Law

The power of a state to apply its law to foreign facts is limited by
various bodies of law. Some limitations are imposed by public
international law, and a transgression of these limitations may lead
to diplomatic protest' or to an unfavorable judgment by the Court of
International Justice. 2 Limitations may also be imposed by the law
of a second state. For example, a court may refuse to recognize or
enforce a foreign judgment on the ground'that in its view the court
of rendition had given an improper extraterritorial application to its
law. 3 Finally, and of greatest importance, there may be local
limitations. The power of a state to apply its law extraterritorially
may be limited, as in the United States, by a constitution or by other
organic law. Even more frequently, such limitations are imposed
upon the power of a state which is a member of a federal union
either by the union itself or by the constitution or other organic law
of the particular member state involved. It is to limitations upon the
power of a member state that this paper will primarily be directed.
Canada, Australia and the United States are federal states, and in
all three there are limitations upon the power of the member states
or provinces to give their laws extraterritorial application. In
Canada, these limitations are found in Section 92 of the British
North America Act which lists the matters that may exclusively be
regulated by the Provincial Legislatures. 4 Of the matters listed in
*Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law and Director, Parker School of Foreign
and Comparative Law, Columbia University; Reporter, Restatement (Second),
Conflict of Laws.
This is the text of the third Horace E. Read lecture delivered at the Dalhousie Law
School on October 3, 1977.
1. See, e.g., The Cutting Case, 1887 U.S. Foreign Rel. 757
2. See, e.g., The S.S. "Lotus" P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10 (1927)
3. Homburger, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (1970), 19
Am. J. Comp. L. 367, at 375
4. The limitations on the power of Canadian provinces and of American states to
apply their law extraterritorially are well and extensively discussed in Hertz, The
Constitution and the Conflict of Laws:. Approaches in Canadian and American Law
(1977), 27 U. Toronto L.J. 1.
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this Section, those that are of particular importance for our purposes
are "Property and Civil Rights in the Province" and "Generally all
Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province." In
Australia, these limitations are found in the constitution or organic
law establishing each member state. For example. Section 5 of the
Constitution Act of New South Wales employs a familiar formula
by empowering the Legislature "to make laws for the peace,
welfare and good government of New South Wales." Section 1 of
the Constitution Act of Victoria authorizes its Legislative Assembly
"to make laws in and for Victoria." In the United States, the
limiting source upon the power of the United States to legislate
extraterritorially is the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
of the Constitution. The due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment plays a similar role in the case of the member states.
By way of contrast, the full faith and credit clause of Article IV,
Section 1 of the Constitution has been primarily employed in the
area of the recognition and enforcement of sister state judgments. 5
On rare occasions, the clause has also been held to require
application of the law of a particular state to determine the rights
and liabilities of the parties, 6 even though application of the law to
one or more other states would have been permissible in the
circumstances under due process.
It will have been noted that all of these limiting provisions are
vaguely worded. As a result, they must depend almost entirely for
their meaning upon the way in which they are interpreted and
applied by the courts. For the same reason, the courts in each of
these three nation-states enjoy great freedom in determining what
limitations, if any, should be imposed upon the extraterritorial
application of law. In making such determinations the courts should
presumably be guided by considerations of what would be best for
their nation as a whole. And since Canada, Australia and the United
States are all federal states, it would seem that these guiding
considerations should generally be the same. So far as is known, no
5. Limitations on the power of a state of the United States to apply its law
extraterritorially have been well discussed in two recent articles. Kirgis, The Roles
of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law (1976), 62 Corn. L.
Rev. 94; Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law (1976), 61 Corn. L.
Rev. 185
6. See, e.g., Order of Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe (1947), 331 U.S. 586 (full
faith and credit requires that rights of members against fraternal benefit society
should be determined by law of state of society's organization)
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court in any of these three nation-states has made a serious attempt
to discuss the factors which are relevant in assessing the propriety of
an extraterritorial application of law. An attempt to do so will here
be made. Particular emphasis will be placed upon United States
materials. This is because the writer is most familiar with these
materials, and also because the question of the propriety of an
extraterritorial application of law appears to have arisen most
frequently in the United States.
Should a Distinctionbe Drawn between Statutes and Common Law
Rules?
A preliminary question that deserves discussion would receive a
different answer in Australia, and probably also in Canada, than in
the United States. The question is whether a distinction should be
drawn for the purpose at hand between statutes and common law
rules of choice of law. More precisely, can a statute be given a
broader sweep of extraterritorial application by means of common
law rules of choice of law than by an explicit provision on the point
in the statute itself?
The problem is well illustrated by the Australian case of Kolsky v.
Mayne Nickless, Ltd. 7 A suit was brought in New South Wales to
recover for a death that had occurred in an automobile accident in
the Australian state of Victoria. The plaintiffs based their claim on
the New South Wales Compensation to Relatives Act. The Act,
which provided that recovery in an action for wrongful death should
not be reduced by reason of the deceased's contributory negligence,
was drafted so as to apply "whether the subject matter of the
complaint arises within or outside New South Wales . . . ." By
way of defence, the defendant alleged as follows: First, the
deceased had died domiciled in Victoria. Second, the defendant was
incorporated and did business in that state. Third, the automobile
involved in the accident was registered in Victoria. Accordingly,
the governing law must be that of Victoria under which the
contributory negligence of the deceased would reduce recovery for
his wrongful death. The plaintiffs demurred to this defence and the
court found in their favor. It stated, without further explanation, that
the provision in the New South Wales Act providing for its
extraterritorial application was beyond the "territorial competence"
7. [1970]92 W.N. (N.S.W.) 855
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of the enacting legislature "at least in the absence of any sufficient
territorial connection" with New South Wales. The court held
nevertheless that the Act was properly applicable by reason of the
common law rule of choice of law enunicated in the British case of
Philips v. Eyre: 8 in order to succeed in a tort action the plaintiff
must show that the defendant's conduct was "actionable" under the
law of the forum and "not justifiable" under the law of the state
where it took place. 9
Such a conclusion would not likely be reached today in the
United States. In the well-known case of Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 10 the Supreme Court stated definitively that the common
law is not "a transcendental body of law outside of any state but
obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute". It is, in the
court's view, as local to the state where it is in effect as is a statute.
Hence it seems clear that in the United States, a state could not by
means of common law rules obtain a wider scope of extraterritorial
application for its legislation than it could by statute. The contrary
result in the Kolsky case (which probably would also be reached in
Canada") is explained by the fact that, unlike the Supreme Court of
the United States, the Supreme Court of Canada and the High Court
of Australia are courts of general appellate jurisdiction that hear
appeals from the provincial and state courts on issues of common
law. As a result, uniform common law rules of choice of law may
be thought to prevail in all Canadian provinces, except Quebec, and
in all Australian states.
Although the explanation for the result reached in Kolsky may be
clear, the case is nevertheless of considerable interest. Its rationale
must rest on the notion that common law rules are not of the same
order as statutes: whereas the latter are the creation of the state of
their enactment, the former have a universal or, at least, national
character. Whatever may be the merits of this view, it does lead to
what to an American is a surprising result: namely, that in Australia,
and probably also in Canada, a statute may obtain a wider sweep of
territorial application by means of common law rule of choice of
law than by an explicit provision in the statute itself.
8. [1870]L.R. 6Q.B.1
9. To the same general effect as Kolsky, see Koop v. Bebb, [ 1951] 84 C.L.R. 629
10. (1938), 304 U.S. 64
11. See, e.g., the statements of the Justices on the effect of common law rules of
choice of law in InterprovincialCo-operatives Ltd. v. The Queen, [1975] 4 N.R.
231; 53 D.L.R. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.)
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The Basic Principle
In determining the outermost reaches of state power, it is desirable
first to ascertain the basic principle involved. No consensus has as
yet developed in Canada, Australia or the United States as to the
guiding principle which determines the permissible limits on the
extraterritorial application of law. In the well-known case of
International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 12 the Supreme
Court of the United States did, however, state the basic principle for
determining the limits under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of a state's judicial jurisdiction. Defining
the power of a state to decide cases in its courts, it was held that the
state must have such contacts with the defendant "as make it
reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to
require the [defendant] to defend the particular suit which is brought
there." It is suggested that essentially the same principle should be
applied with reference to the extraterritorial application of law.
Thus in an interprovincial or interstate case in Canada, Australia or
the United States, the basic question should be whether it be
reasonable, in the context of the federal system involved, to apply
the law of the particular state to the given state of foreign facts. In
international cases, the test would be modified by the substitution of
"international system" for "federal system."
The InternationalShoe test requires that two conditions be met to
give a state judicial jurisdiction. Firstly, the state must be a fair
place from the standpoint of the defendant for the trial of the action.
Secondly, trial in the state must be consistent with the needs of the
federal system. This second requirement has rarely been mentioned
in the cases, but is of great importance nevertheless and indeed
forms the basis of the majority opinion of the Supreme Court in
Hanson v. Denckla. 13 That fairness to the defendant is not the only
criterion of judicial jurisdiction can also be made clear by a simple
hypothetical.
Suppose that suit is brought in State X on a transaction whose
contacts are purely with State Y. In accordance with the X statute,
the defendant is served by registered mail in Y. The defendant lives
12. (1945), 326 U.S. 310
13. (1958), 357 U.S. 235 (In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Warren stated that
constitutional restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of the state courts are "'more
than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.")
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near the Y border, and the courthouse where the suit would be tried
in X is considerably closer to the defendant's home than is the
closest courthouse in Y. Here it could hardly be contended that suit
in X would be inconvenient for the defendant; indeed it might be
considerably more convenient than would be a suit in Y.
Nevertheless, it is entirely clear, in view of the total absence of X
contacts, that X would lack judicial jurisdiction to try the case. This
would not be primarily because of considerations of fairness for the
defendant, but rather because it would be inconsistent both with the
needs of the federal system and with the exclusive interests of State
Y, for the suit to be brought in State X, which has no interest in the
14
case.
It is believed that the same considerations should be applied to
determine the propriety of an extraterritorial application of law.
Such application should not be unfair from the standpoint of those
whose interests would be affected. It should also be consistent with
the needs of the federal system involved or, in an international case,
with the needs of the international system in general. This can be
made clearer by an extreme and quite unrealistic hypothetical.
Suppose that a resident of Nova Scotia is struck while crossing a
street in London by an automobile being driven by an Englishman
on the left hand side of the street. Upon his return to Nova Scotia,
he somehow obtains jurisdiction over the Englishman and here
brings suit to recover for his injuries. His claim is that the defendant
had been negligent in driving on the left side of the street as by
English law. Clearly, it would be improper for the Nova Scotia
court in these circumstances to apply its law, which requires that
one drive on the right, and thereby hold the defendant liable.
With good logic, one could say that such application of Nova
Scotia law would violate Section 92 of the British North America
Act. The issue at hand did not involve either "Property and Civil
Rights" or "Matters of a merely local or private Nature" in Nova
Scotia. But, in this writer's opinion, there are two other factors
which would make application of Nova Scotia law inconceivable.
The first is that it would be entirely unfair to apply this law to hold
the defendant liable for injury caused in England by an act required
14. Lower federal courts have explicitly said that the interest of a state in having
the case tried in its courts is an important criterion for determining whether the state
has judicial jurisdiction. See, e.g., Farrellv. Piedmont Aviation, Inc. (1969), 411
F. 2d 812 (2d. Cir.); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Birdsong (1966), F .2d 344 (5th
Cir.)
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by English law under which he would not be liable. Clearly, the
defendant in this case had moulded his conduct upon English law.
To apply the law of Nova Scotia would disappoint his justified
expectations. The second and equally important factor is that
application of Nova Scotian law would be inconsistent with the
needs of the international system. It would result in frustrating the
policy of England, the state with by far the greatest interest in the
resolution of the particular issue. Without question, the answer to
our hypothetical would be the same if, in place of Nova Scotia, we
were to substitute an American or an Australian state. In the United
States, it would be said that application of the law of the American
state would violate due process. Application of the law of the
Australian state would be struck down in Australia usually for the
stated reason that the "peace, order and good government" of the
particular state were not involved. Whatever the formulation relied
upon, the two basic factors would be the same: application of the
law of the Canadian province, or of the Australian or American
state, would be unfair to the defendant and would be inconsistent
with the needs of the international system by frustrating the policy
of the state with by far the greatest interest in the matter.
The two basic factors discussed above are surely as important in
an interprovincial (Canada) or interstate (Australia or the United
States) case as they are in the international arena. The question
remains, however, whether the considerations involving these areas
are necessarily the same. Express authority on the point seems to be
lacking. It can be suggested, however, that because of the needs of
the interstate system, the power of a member state to apply its law
extraterritorially may be more restricted in the interstate than in the
international area.- 5 In Australia and the United States, this may be
in part because of the full faith and credit clauses of their respective
constitutions. In the international area, a court may protect the vital
interests of its own state by refusing to recognize or enforce the
judgment of another state which disregarded those interests. On the
other hand, by reason of full faith and credit, a state court in
Australia 16 or the United States' 7 cannot refuse on such a ground to
recognize or enforce the judgment of a sister state. In an interstate
15. For a similar suggestion, see Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws 9,
Commentd.
16. Harrisv. Harris,(1947) Vict. L.R. 44
17. Fauntleroy v. Lum (1908), 210 U.S. 230
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system, a state should perhaps be required to have greater regard for
the interests of a sister state than one nation can be expected to have
for those of another.
Not surprisingly, no actual case has been found with such an
outrageous extraterritorial application of law as the hypothetical
situation discussed above. Nevertheless the hypothetical illustrates
in stark fashion the two basic factors involved and demonstrates that
these factors are likely to be present, although in different degrees,
in every case. We proceed now to a discussion of these two factors.
Fairnessto the Parties
Fairness to the parties should always be an important criterion.
Rarely, if ever, would a state seek to apply its law extraterritorially,
as in our hypothetical, to impose a burden upon a person who had
acted in another state in the way required by that state's law and,
moreover, without reason to suppose that his act would have effects
elsewhere. But there are situations where an extraterritorial
application of law has been struck down at least partially because of
considerations of fairness to the parties. Such situations arise when
a person has acted in another state, perhaps not in actual reliance
upon application of that state's law but, in any event, with no
adequate reason to foresee that he would be held subject to the law
invoked. Two illustrative cases will be mentioned, one from the
United States and the other from Canada.
John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 18 a decision by the
Supreme Court of the United States, involved a suit upon a life
insurance policy that had been applied for and issued in New York
to a New York resident. The insured was suffering from cancer at
the time, but his application to the insurance company contained the
false statement that he had not recently been under medical care. As
a consequence, under New York law, the insurance company had a
complete defence on the policy. After the insured's death, his
widow moved to Georgia. There she obtained judgment on the
policy by application of the Georgia rule that a false statement in an
insurance policy is not material if the agent who solicited the policy
was aware of the true facts. There was no suggestion that the
insurance company had actually acted in reliance upon the
application of New York law, as, for example, by charging lower
premiums. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reversed, stating that
18. (1936), 299U.S. 178
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"there was no occurrence, nothing done" in Georgia, and
accordingly that Georgia law could not constitutionally be applied
to deprive the insurance company of a defence it enjoyed under New
York law. Although the point was not expressly referred to in the
opinion, Yates appears to be a good example of an unfair
extraterritorial application of an unforeseeable law.
The Canadian case is the well-known Royal Bank of Canada v.
The King. 19 There bonds had been sold in England to provide for
the construction of a railroad in the Province of Alberta. After a
change of administration, the Alberta Legislature enacted a statute
whereby the proceeds of the bonds would be paid to the Province
instead of being used for the construction of the railroad, and the
Province would assume primary liability to the bondholders. Suit
was thereafter brought by the Province in the name of the Crown to
recover such proceeds of the bonds as were on deposit in the
defendant bank. On appeal to the Privy Council, the statute was
declared invalid. The rights of the British lenders against the bank
were held to be "outside the province" of Alberta and accordingly
not affected under Section 92 of the British North America Act by
Alberta legislation. That considerations of fairness had much to do
with that decision is made clear in the judgment. The Privy Council
emphasized the "well-established principle of the English common
law" that one who has paid money to another for a purpose that has
failed should be entitled to recover it. This principle of fairness
combined with the extraterritorial aspects of the case led to the
overturn of the statute.
The Royal Bank of Canada case should be compared with A.G.
Ont. v. Scott. 2 0 In this latter case the Supreme Court of Canada held
that the Ontario Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act could
validly be applied to provide for confirmation hearings in Ontario of
a support order obtained in England by a wife against a husband
who, at all relevant times, had resided and been physically present
in Ontario. One could argue with some plausibility that the right of
the wife in England against her husband was neither a "civil right"
nor a matter of a "merely local or private Nature" within Ontario.
Thus, as a matter of strict language, the statute as applied did not
fall within the provincial powers granted by Section 92 of the
British North America Act.
19. [1913]A.C. 283
20. [1956] S.C.R. 137, 1D.L.R. (2d) 433
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The court, however, distinguished the Royal Bank of Canada case
on the ground that there is a significant difference "between vesting
a right and extinguishing it." Notwithstanding this point, it is
almost certain that considerations of fairness were at the root of
these two decisions and possibly played a more influential role than
did the literal wording of Section 92 of the British North America
Act.
Considerations of fairness are most likely to come to the fore in
situations where a person acts with deliberation and forethought.
The most obvious case is where the person deliberately acts in the
way required by state law, as in the English accident hypothetical
discussed above. Such considerations will also be present, although
in lesser degree, in cases where a person does not actually mold his
conduct upon the specific provisions of a state's law but
nevertheless acts as other persons do in that state with the
expectation that a contract, or a contractual provision, will be held
valid and effective. In such a situation, extraterritorial application of
an unforeseeable law that would disappoint these expectations may
well be improper. A case in point is John Hancock Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Yates, which has already been discussed. 2 1 Lilienthal v.
Kaufman, 22 an Oregon decision, is also illustrative. In that case, an
Oregon spendthrift traveled to California and there obtained a loan
from a California resident. Suit to recover on this loan was defeated
thereafter in the Oregon courts by application of Oregon's
spendthrift statute. California law did not recognize such a defence.
This decision is open to serious criticism on ordinary choice-of-law
principles. 2 3 It may also have been unconstitutional on the ground
that it deprived the plaintiff of due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. To be
sure, Oregon had an interest in applying its law to protect its
resident. However, the transaction had taken place wholly in
California under whose law the defendant had no defence. It may
well be that the California plaintiff had made the loan without being
aware of the precise provisions of California law. But he had
certainly acted in the belief that he was owed a valid obligation and
was ignorant both of the defendant's status as a spendthrift and of
the provisions of Oregon's spendthrift law. Application of this
21. See text at note 18, supra
22. (1964), 293 Or. 1; 395 P.2d 543
23. See Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process (Ann Arbor: The University of
Michigan Press, 1965), at 189-192
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Oregon law clearly disappointed the plaintiffs expectations and on
the particular facts may have been unconstitutional.
Considerations of fairness are less significant in situations where,
as in the ordinary negligence case, a person acts without forethought
and on the spur of the moment. Under these circumstances, a person
has few relevant expectations to be disappointed by the extraterritorial application of a foreign law. Accordingly, a decision holding
such application of law to be improper would be more likely to find
its justification in the needs of the interstate or international
systems. It is to considerations of this sort that we now turn our
attention.
The Needs of the Interstateor InternationalSystems
As has been said above, it is the thesis of this paper that the same
basic principle should be applied to determine the propriety of either
an exercise of judicial jurisdiction over a hon-resident or an
extraterritorial application of law. This principle is that in a federal
union the action taken should be "reasonable, in the context of [the]
federal system of government". Stated more precisely, it should be
fair from the standpoint of the parties and also consistent with the
needs of the interstate system. At least in the United States,
considerations of fairness to the defendant have been emphasized
most frequently in cases of judicial jurisdiction. The needs of the
interstate or international systems have played a comparable role in
the relatively few cases concerned with the extraterritorial
application of law. This is not because the relative importance of
these two values differs from one area to the other. Rather it is
simply because the element of fairness to the defendant has been
particularly obvious in the majority of the cases involving judicial
jurisdiction that have arisen to date.
Brief discussion of several decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States may here be instructive. We start with New York Life
Insurance Co. v. Head24 which involved the question whether
Missouri insurance law could constitutionally be applied to modify
the terms of a loan made on a life insurance policy. The policy had
originally been issued in Missouri to a person who was only
temporarily present in the state and who had his home in New
Mexico. While still domiciled in New Mexico, the insured had
transferred the policy to his daughter. She in turn by letter sent from
24. (1913), 234 U.S. 149
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New Mexico, requested a loan from the insurance company in New
York. The loan was granted. The agreement stated that the loan and
the interest thereon was payable at the insurance company's home
office in New York and that the effect of any default in the payment
of interest on the loan would be determined by the law of New
York. Following such a default, the daughter brought suit on the
policy in the Missouri courts. She contended that the applicable law
was that of Missouri which would have given her more protection
than that of New York. The Missouri courts accepted her
contention. The Supreme Court, however reversed, on the ground
that such application of Missouri law was unconstitutional, "since it
would be impossible to permit the statute of Missouri to operate
beyond the jurisdiction of that State and in the State of New York
and there destroy freedom of contract without throwing down the
constitutional barriers by which all States are restricted within the
orbits of their lawful authority and upon the preservation of which
the government under the Constitution depends." Clearly, the basis
of the Court's decision was that the Constitution assigns "orbits of
• . . lawful authority" to each state and that any attempt by a state
to transcend its orbit must be rejected as inconsistent with the needs
of the federal system.
Home Insurance Co. v. Dick25 is an important case. A fire
insurance policy covering a tug in Mexican waters had been issued
in Mexico to a Mexican resident by a Mexican insurance company.
The policy provided that any loss should be payable in Mexico and
that suit on the policy must be brought within one year of the date on
which the loss occurred. The policy was assigned in Mexico to Dick
prior to the loss of the tug which also occurred in Mexico. At the
time of the assignment, Dick resided in Mexico although his
domicile was in Texas. Following the loss of the tug, Dick returned
to Texas and there brought suit against the defendant insurance
company, which had reinsured part of the risk. The defence was that
suit had not been brought within one year of the loss as required by
the policy. Dick, however, contended that this defence should be
rejected by reason of a Texas statute which invalidated any
provision limiting the time for bringing suit to a period under two
years. The Texas courts upheld this contention, but the Supreme
Court reversed on the ground that such application of the Texas
statute deprived the defendant of property without due process of
25. (1930), 281 U.S. 397
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law. This was because "nothing in any way relating to the policy
sued on, or to the contracts of reinsurance, was ever done or
required to be done in Texas . . . . The fact that Dick's permanent

residence was in Texas is without significance. At all times here
material he was physically present and acting in Mexico."
Fairness to the defendant insurance company was clearly not the
principal basis of this decision. At least, there is nothing in the
Court's opinion which suggests either that the defendant would not
have reinsured the risk but for the provision in the policy restricting
the time for bringing suit, or that the defendant charged a lower
amount because of this provision. Rather, as the language quoted
from the opinion makes clear, the basic reason for the reversal was
that, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, Texas was seeking to
apply its statute to a situation in which it had relatively little interest
and certainly far less of an interest than Mexico. Dick, it will have
been noted, was an international, rather than an interstate, case.
Hence it must stand for the proposition that, at least in the opinion
of the Supreme Court of the United States, the needs of the
international system require that states should apply their law only
within the "orbits" of their "lawful authority". Stated negatively,
it appears that states should not give their law extraterritorial
application in situations where to do so would frustrate the policy of
a state having a far greater interest in the determination of the matter
at hand.
Another significant decision is Clay v. Sun Insurance Office
Ltd.26 It there appeared that, while domiciled in Illinois, the
plaintiff had purchased in that state from the defendant insurance
company a policy which insured him against the loss of personal
property. A few months later, the plaintiff changed his domicile to
Florida and there the loss occurred. The plaintiff brought suit in
Florida after the lapse of the twelve month period provided in the
policy. The question was whether the Florida statute, which
invalidated provisions limiting the time for bringing suit to a period
under five years, could constitutionally be applied. The Supreme
Court answered this question in the affirmative. In its brief opinion,
the Court stressed that the defendant insurance company must have
realized that the plaintiff might move to other states, since the
policy protected him wherever he might go. Moreover, since the
defendant was licensed to do business in Florida, "it must have
26. (1964), 377 U.S. 179
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been known that it might be sued there." Although the opinion only
laid stress upon considerations of fairness to the defendant, it seems
clear that Florida had sufficient interest in the case to justify
application of its law. The loss had occurred in Florida at a time
when the plaintiff was domiciled in that state. Accordingly, Florida
had good cause to be concerned with the plaintiffs welfare and he
must have belonged to the class that the statute in question was
designed to protect. There was also the further fact that the
defendant insurance company was licensed to do business in
Florida.
The Clay case should be contrasted with John Hancock Mutual
27
Life Insurance Co. v. Yates, which has already been discussed
and in which, it will be recalled, the insured's widow moved to
Georgia following his death. Application of Georgia law to protect
the widow was there declared unconstitutional although Georgia
had an obvious interest in her welfare. Such application would have
been unfair to the insurance company since, in contrast to Clay, the
two most significant events - i.e., the issuance of the policy and
the insured's death - had occurred before the widow moved to
Florida. Such application would also have been inconsistent with
the needs of the interstate system, since it would permit the
beneficiary of an insurance policy to obtain a state's favourable law,
following the occurrence of the loss, by the simple expedient of
moving his domicile to that state. A rule of this sort would make it
difficult, if not impossible, for insurance companies to calculate the
extent of their risks and thus might be harmful to the interstate
system by imposing an improper burden upon the insurance industry
as a whole.
OtherFactors
We now turn to a consideration of other factors which bear upon the
propriety of an application of law to foreign facts. One factor is the
extent to which the contacts are grouped in the state whose law is
sought to be applied. It may be that in an ideal world this factor
should have at most only secondary significance. It can be argued
persuasively that, irrespective of the contacts, a state can have no
justification for giving a rule extraterritorial application in situations
where no policy underlying the rule would be furthered by doing so.
Nevertheless, it seems clear that the massing of contacts in a state
27. See text at note 18, supra
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may be of crucial importance in the current stage of choice-of-law
thinking. Take the case, for example, where a resident of state X is
negligently killed in state Y by another resident of X. Suit is brought
in X to recover for the wrongful death, but all of the deceased's next
of kin reside in state Z. The X and Z rules differ with respect to the
way in which the proceeds of a recovery for wrongful death should
be divided. Here it seems clear that Z has by far the greater, if not
the exclusive, interest in the application of its rule of division.
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that on these facts an application by
X of its own rule would today be held unconstitutional.
A second factor is whether the state whose law is sought to be
applied would be the state of the applicable law under a recognized
rule of choice of law. Suppose, for example, that in state X a
resident of state Y, all of whose next of kin reside in Y, is
negligently killed by another Y resident. Suit is brought in X to
recover for the wrongful death. In this case, Y is clearly the only
state which has any real interest in how the proceeds of the recovery
should be divided. Also the great majority of the significant contacts
are grouped in Y. Nevertheless, it is believed that application of X
law would not be held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the
United States. This is because X is the state of injury. A classical
rule of choice of law, which still has a substantial following, 28
directs that rights and liabilities in tort should be determined by the
law of this state. It is surmised that application of X law would in
this case also be held proper in Canada and Australia, which adhere
to the rule of Philips v. Eyre.29 In any event, the general principle
would still hold true that a state will be privileged to apply its law,
even though no interest of its own would be served by doing so, if it
is the state of the applicable law under a recognized rule of choice of
law.
Another factor is whether the interest of the state would be served
by the extraterritorial application of its rule. This is of extreme
importance. Any extraterritorial application of a rule is likely to
interfere with the interests of other states, and such interference can
hardly be justified unless, at the very least, it would result in the
furtherance of some substantial interest. Whether a state has an
interest in the extraterritorial application of a rule depends upon
whether such application would result in the advancement of
28. See, for example, the cases collected in Hagemann, The "New Learning" and
Choice of Laiv in Tort Cases (1977), 22 S.D.L. Rev. 253, at 270-271
29. [1870]L.R. 6Q.B. I
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purpose or policy of the rule. If not, such application might well be
thought improper. Nevertheless, as has been said, it seems unlikely
that at the present time an extraterritorial application of law would
be held unconstitutional in situations where either a substantial
number of the contacts are massed in the state whose law was
sought to be applied, or the state is that of the applicable law under a
well-established rule of choice of law. In other situations, however,
furtherance of the purpose or policy of a rule should be an essential
condition to the validity of its extraterritorial application.
Assuming that this condition is met and,that basic considerations
of fairness to the parties are satisfied, there is still the question
whether an extraterritorial application of law would result in an
improper sacrifice of the interests of other states or of the interstate
or international systems as a whole. As has been seen, these latter
interests were afforded protection by the decisions of the Supreme
Court in New York Life Insurance Co. v. Head,30 Home Insurance
2
Co. v. Dick3 ' and John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates. 3 It
is thought, however, that some recent state 33 and lower-federal
court decisions in the United States have paid these interests
insufficient regard. Rosenthal v. Warren,3 4 a decision by a federal
Court of Appeals, will serve as an illustration. In that case,
Rosenthal, who was domiciled in New York, went to Boston to be
operated on by the defendant Warren, a world-renowned surgeon.
Rosenthal died after the operation, and suit to recover for his
allegedly wrongful death was brought against Warren in New York.
He claimed by way of partial defence that in no event could
damages be recovered in excess of $50,000 - the maximum
recovery permitted at that time by the Massachusetts wrongful death
statute. This defence was struck down on the basis of what the court
deemed to be New York's strong policy against damage limitations.
The result is highly unfortunate. To be sure, since Rosenthal was a
New York resident, a purpose of the New York rule against damage
limitations was presumably served by its extraterritorial application
in this case. On the other hand, this result was achieved at the
sacrifice not only of greater Massachusetts' interests but also of
30. See text at note 24, supra
31. See text at note 25, supra
32. See text at note 18, supra
33. Lilienthal v. Kaufman, discussed in text at note 22, supra, is an obvious
example.
34. (1973), 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.)
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those of the interstate system as well. The Massachusetts rule
limiting the amount of recovery was surely designed to protect
residents, such as Dr. Warren. In addition, all of the relevant
contacts, save that of Rosenthal's residence, were grouped in
Massachusetts. Accordingly, the case must stand for the proposition
that a state can apply its rule to protect its residents wherever they
may travel irrespective of the countervailing interests of other
states. 3 5 It means that the obligations of one who remains at home
will depend, at least in part, upon the domicile of any person he may
injure. It means also that the only way such a person can avoid
being subjected to liability under a foreign law is.to refuse to deal
with foreign residents. Results such as this are thought to be quite
inconsistent with the needs of a federal system. These needs
require, as a minimum, that each state refrain from interfering in
matters that are of far greater concern to another and that no state
apply its rules in a way that would seriously deter persons from
dealing with residents of other states. Future cases will presumably
determine more precisely the limits of a state's orbit of lawful
authority with respect to the extraterritorial application of its laws.
Even if future cases limit materially the power of a state to give
extraterritorial application to its law, ample room will still remain
for the operation of common law rules of choice of law. Today in
the United States, the normal case involving multistate contacts is
one where the law of a number of states can lawfully be applied
under due process. Accordingly, a court must resort to a
choice-of-law rule to determine which law to apply in the decision
of the case. This situation will inevitably continue except for those
cases where the Supreme Court mandates the application of the law
of a particular state. On the basis of past experience, cases of the
latter sort will be few in number. 36 Out of considerations of
fairness, however, the Supreme Court has recently taken such
action in the case of the escheat of intangible obligations owed by a
35. A case applying New York law in an equally extreme situation is Tjepkema v.
Kenney, 31 A.D. 2d 908, 298 N.Y.S.2d 175 (lst Dep't 1969).
36. On a few occasions, the Supreme Court has laid down hard-and-fast rules of
choice of law. Subsequent experience has usually shown these rules to be
unsatisfactory and, with two exceptions, they have been discarded. (Reese, Full
Faith and Credit to Statutes: The Defense of Public Policy (1952), 19 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 339. One of these exceptions concerns the law governing the rights of a
member against a fraternal benefit society. See note 6, supra. The second
exception involves escheat and is discugsed in the text that follows immediately
below.
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multistate corporation. Usually, a number of states will have
sufficient contact with the intangible - as, for example, the state
where the obligation was incurred, or was to be paid or which was
the domicile of the creditor etc. - to justify application of their
respective laws under normal due process standards. But such an
approach would permit a number of states to apply their law of
escheat and thereby expose the debtor to the danger of having to pay
a debt more than once. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has laid
down a hard-and-fast rule of due process that "the right and power
to escheat the debt [belongs] to the State of the creditor's last known
address as shown by the debtor's books and records."37
In conclusion, comparison can usefully be made between the
approach taken by the Supreme Courts of Canada and of the United
States in cases involving essentially the same problem. The
Canadian case is Interprovincial Co-operatives Ltd. v. The
Queen.3 8 The question was whether Manitoba could apply its
statute to hold the defendants liable for damage caused by placing
mercury in streams in Ontario and Saskatchewan with the
permission of the authorities of those Provinces. By a closely
divided vote, a majority of the Court answered this question in the
negative. Three members of the Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Pigeon, held that Manitoba lacked power to apply its statute
under Section 92 of the British North America Act. Since the
defendants' acts had not been done "in the Province". In view of
the interprovincial nature of the problem only the Canadian
Parliament could supply a legislative solution. Speaking only for
himself, Justice Ritchie, who was one of the majority of four, held
that the case was governed by common law principles of conflict of
laws. Under the rule of Philips v. Eyre the defendants could not be
held liable for acts that were justifiable under the law of the state
where they were done. In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Laskin
joined by two other judges, held that Manitoba, as the place of
injury, had constitutional power to apply its law under "common
law choice of law" principles. Furthermore Manitoba had the
''predominant interest" in the decision of the question at hand.
37. Texas v. New Jersey (1965), 379 U.S. 674; Pennsylvaina v. New York,
(1972), 407 U.S. 206
38. [1975] 4 N.R. 231, 53 D.L.R. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.) (For a thorough discussion of
this case, see Hertz, Interprovincial, The Constitution and the Conflict of Laws
(1976), 26 U. Toronto L.J. 84)
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The American case is Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance
Corp., Ltd..39 It involved the question whether Louisiana could
constitutionally apply its direct action statute to permit a person
injured in that state to bring suit against a foreign insurance
company without first having established the liability of the insured.
The insurance policies in question contained a "no action" clause,
which prohibited direct actions of the sort provided for in Louisiana.
This clause was valid and effective under the law of the states where
the policies had been issued and delivered. As in the Interprovincial
case, the suit in Watson was intended to impose upon the defendant
a liability to which it was not subject under the law of the state
where its conduct had taken place. But in Watson the applicability
of the Louisiana statute was upheld by a unanimous court. In his
opinion, Justice Black first pointed out that the defendant insurance
company did a nationwide business and that the policies provided
protection against liability for injuries suffered "anywhere in the
United States." Accordingly, although the Justice did not explicitly
make this point, application of Louisiana law would not be unfair to
the defendant insurance company which could have foreseen that an
injury covered by the policy might occur in that state. The opinion
incidentally mentions the fact that the defendant was licensed to do
business in Louisiana.
Justice Black then addressed himself to the needs of the federal
system. He stated in this regard that:
Louisiana's direct action statute is not intermeddling in affairs
beyond her boundaries which are no concern of hers. Persons
injured or killed in Louisiana are most likely to be Louisiana
residents, and even if not, Louisiana may have to care for them.
Serious injuries may require treatment in Louisiana homes or
hospitals by Louisiana doctors. The injured may be destitute.
They may be compelled to call upon friends, relatives, or the
public for help. Louisiana has manifested its natural interest in
the injured by providing remedies for recovery of damages. It has
a similar interest in policies of insurance which are designed to
assure payment of such damages.
It will have been noted that Justice Black did not find it necessary
to inquire whether Louisiana law could be deemed applicable under
ordinary choice-of-law principles or whether Louisiana was the
state with the greatest interest in the decision of the case. For him, it
was enough that extraterritorial application of the statute would not
39. (1954), 348 U.S. 66
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be unfair to the defendant and that Louisiana had sufficient interest
in the case to justify such application. Almost surely, the
Interprovincial case would have been decided differently if it had
arisen in the United States and had involved states of that country.
Conclusion
Canada, Australia and the United States are all federal states and, as
such, have common needs and interests. In each country, provisions
that differ widely in their wording impose limitations upon the
powers of the member states to apply their law extraterritorially.
Those provisions, however, are all so vaguely worded that they can
mean little in the absence of judicial interpretation. In none of these
three: countries does this task of interpretation appear to be greatly
advanced. It has been the thesis of this paper that two basic
principles should be considered in determining the propriety of an
extraterritorial application of law. These are that such application
should be essentially fair to the parties and also consistent with the
needs of the interstate, or international, systems. These principles in
turn are vague and leave much room for interpretation. Nevertheless, they provide the essential bases for further developments in
this important field.

